DRAFT
Foundations in International Security, 6690
Professor Steven E. Lobell
Department of Political Science
152A
(801) 585-5259
steven.lobell@poli-sci.utah.edu
http://www.poli-sci.utah.edu/~slobell
2-5 M; Spring 2008
This is a graduate course on the foundations of international security. This course will examine the concept of security from both the macro and micro level. We will discuss a mix of security strategies (balance of power, alliances, rearmament, collective security, deterrence), perspectives on security (neorealism, neoliberalism, critical theory, Copenhagen School), great power and third world security, democratic and non-democratic security, classic threats (changes in relative power, proliferation) and new threats (environment, population, terrorism), and concepts of security ranging from state survival, to societal security, to unit level-variables such as Human Security.
In developing the syllabus I have attempted to focus on core differences, theoretical debates, and varied styles of methodologies and research styles in the field of international security. The most difficult decisions in preparing this course include selecting what readings to assign to represent a particular perspective, which topics to cover, how much of a debate to follow, and when to move to another topic. As a result, while this course is intended as a general introduction to the field, there are areas that other scholars might emphasize more (or less).
Course Requirement
Regular attendance and participation is expected. You should come to each class prepared to discuss the material. Your participation is essential for this course to work.
You will be required to write two papers and to lead at least one class discussion. The papers must be spaced out in the course and you can not write on the same topic twice.
Paper #1: 15 pages
This paper is a critical review of one or more topics in class. More than a summary, this assignment entails comparing and contrasting authors within or across topics. You should discuss where authors agree and disagree, and why. In some instances, one author in a debate is building on another – what is the ‘value-added’ in this instance? In other cases, author A argues that X leads to Y, where author B includes variable Z. Which is the more important causal factor?
Paper #2: 15 pages
This paper requires that you discuss an interesting puzzle, gap, or question in the literature and outline how you would go about resolving it.
Alternatively, you can begin to develop your own hypothesis. This can entail an elaboration, extension, or different application of another’s argument. For example, balance of threat theory elaborates on balance of power theory by incorporating both the traditional notion of power and threat to explain alliance behavior.
Class discussant and participation
You will be required to give a 20 minute presentation analyzing the readings for a particular week. Since the entire class has read the material, the discussant should not summarize the reading but discuss critical debates, differences, and agreements among the authors.
Grading
Regular attendance and participation (30 percent).
Paper
#1: 15 pages (30 percent).
Paper #2: 15 pages (30 percent).
Class discussant (10
percent).
Course
Each week we will explore a topic in international security. Always bring the assigned reading for the
week to class since we will often refer to specific sections, tables, charts,
graphs, etc.
Required reading is available at the University Book Store, the Marriot Library’s Electronic Reserve (ER), and on full-text data-bases at the Marriott Library.
For Electronic copies (ER) click on Course Reserves from the Marriott Library’s home page, and then click on the Electronic Copy link. If any of the assigned reading is unavailable, contact me immediately via email and I will resolve the problem (steven.lobell@poli-sci.utah.edu).
Course Schedule
1/7 Introduction
Stephen M. Walt, “The Renaissance of Security Studies.” International Studies Quarterly 35, 2 (1991), 211-239.
1/14 Offensive, Defensive and
Neoclassical Realism
Hans J. Morgenthau, Politics Among Nations, 3rd ed.
John J. Mearsheimer, The Tragedy of Great Power Politics.
Kenneth N. Waltz, “The Origins of War in Neorealist Theory.” Journal of Interdisciplinary History 18, 4 (Spring, 1988), 615-28.
Jeffrey Taliaferro, “Security Seeking under Anarchy: Defensive Realism Reconsidered,” International Security 25, 3 (Winter 2000/2001), 128-61.
Jeffrey W. Taliaferro, Steven E. Lobell, and Norrin M. Ripsman, “Introduction.” In Neoclassical Realism, the State, and Foreign Policy, ed. Steven E. Lobell, Norrin M. Ripsman, and Jeffrey W. Taliaferro (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, forthcoming). (ER)
Fareed Zakaria, From Wealth to Power: The Unusual Origins of America’s World Role (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1998), Chapter 2. (ER)
See
Jeffrey W. Legro and Andrew Moravcsik, “Is
Anybody Still a Realist?” International Security
24, 2 (fall 1999), 5-55.
Alexander Wendt, “Anarchy is What States Make
of It,” International Organization
46, 2 (Spring 1992), 391-425.
1/28 Realist Theories of War and
Peace
A.F.K. Organski, World Politics, 2nd ed. (New York: Knopf, 1968). Chapter 14. (ER)
George Modelski, "The Long Cycle of Global Politics and the Nation-State," Comparative Studies in Society and History 20 (1978), 214-235.
Robert Gilpin, “The Theory of Hegemonic War,” Journal of Interdisciplinary History 18 (Spring 1988), 591-614.
Dale C. Copeland, “Neorealism and the Myth of Bipolar Stability: Toward a New Dynamic Realist Theory of Major War,” Security Studies 5, 3 (1996), 29-89.
2/4 Balance of Power, Balance of
Threat, Balance of Interest, and Omni balancing
Jack Levy, “What do Great Powers Balance
Against and When?” In Balance of Power:
Theory and Practice in the 21st Century, ed. T.V. Paul, James J.
Wirtz, and Michael Fortmann
(Stanford:
Stephen Walt, "
Steven David, “Explaining Third World Alignment,” World Politics 43, 2 (January 1991), 233-56.
Randall L. Schweller, “Bandwagoning
for Profit: Bringing the
John J. Mearsheimer, The Tragedy of Great Power Politics (
Michael Barnett and Jack S.
Levy, “Domestic Sources of Alliances
and Alignment: The Case of
Skim
Briefly
Glenn H. Snyder, “The
Security Dilemma in
2/11 The
Barry Posen, “European Union Security and Defense Policy: Response to Unipolarity?” Security Studies 15, 2 (July 2006), 149-186.
Christopher Layne, “Unipolar Illusion
Revisited: The Coming End of the
Aaron Friedberg, The Future of U.S.-China Relations: Is Conflict Inevitable?” International Security 30, 2 (Fall 2005), pp. 7-45
Thomas Christensen, “Fostering Stability or Creating a Monster? The
Rise of
Robert Pape, “Soft Balancing against the
William C. Wohlforth, “The Stability of a Unipolar World,” International Security 24, 1 (Summer 1999), 5-41.
Skim Briefly
Barry R. Posen and Andrew L. Ross, “Competing Visions for
2/25 Rational Theories of War
and War Termination
James Fearon, “Rationalist Explanations for War,” International Organization 49, 3 (Summer 1995), 379-414.
Erik Gartzke, “War is in the Error Term,” International Organization, 53, 3 (Summer 1999), 567-87.
H.E. Goemans, “A Theory of War Termination,” War and Punishment: The Causes of War
Termination and the First World War, Princeton:
Christopher H. Achen and Duncan Snidal, “Rational Deterrence Theory and Comparative Case Studies,” World Politics 41, 2 (January 1989), 143-169.
Skim Briefly
Robert Pape, “The Strategic Logic of Suicide Terrorism,” American Political Science Review 97, 3 (August 2003), 343-61.
See
Nehemia Geva and Alex Mintz, Decision Making on War and Peace: The Cognitive-Rational Debate (Boulder: Lynne Rienner, 1997).
Stephen Walt, “Rigor or Rigor Mortis: Rational Choice and Security Studies,” International Security 23, 4 (Spring 1999), 5-48.
3/3 The
Political Economy of Security of Studies
Mark Brawley. Liberal leadership: Great Powers and their Challengers in Peace and War (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1993). Chapter 1 (ER).
Paul A. Papayoanou, “Economic Interdependence and the Balance of Power,” International Studies Quarterly 41 (1997), 113-140.
Lars Skalnes, “Grand Strategy and Foreign Economic Policy: British Grand Strategy in the 1930s,” World Politics 50, 4 (1998), 582-616.
Kevin Narizny, The Political Economy of Grand Strategy (Princeton:
Etel Solingen, “The Political Economy of Nuclear Restraint,” International Security 19, 2 (1994), 126-69.
Steven Lobell, “War is Politics: Offensive Realism, Domestic Politics, and Security Strategies,” Security Studies 12, 2 (winter 2002/3), 165-95.
3/10 Liberal Theories of Peace
and War
Randall Schweller, “Domestic Structures and Preventive Wars: Are Democracies More Pacific,” Word Politics 44, 2 (January 1992), 235-269.
Charles A. Kupchan and Clifford A. Kupchan, “The Promise of Collective Security.” International Security 20 (Summer 1995), 52-61.
John M. Owen, IV, “Transnational Liberalism and
G. John Ikenberry, After Victory: Institutions, Strategic Restraint, and the Rebuilding of
Order After Major Wars (Princeton:
Emanual Adler and Michael Barnett, “Security Communities in Theoretical Perspectives,” in Security Communities (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1998), Chapter 2 (ER).
Critique
Christopher Layne, “Kant or Cant: The Myth of the Democratic Peace,” International Security 19, 2 (Fall 1994), 5-49 .
John J. Mearsheimer, “The False Promise of International Institutions,” International Security 19 (Winter 1994/95): 5-49.
Skim Briefly
T.V. Paul and Norrin Ripsman,
“Under Pressure? Globalization and the
Guy Ben-Porat, "Between Power and Hegemony: Business Communities in Peace Processes," Review of International Studies 35, 2, (2005), 325-348
See
Andrew Moravcsik, “Taking Preferences Seriously: A Liberal Theory of International Politics,” International Organization 51, 4 (autumn 1997), 513-53.
Michael E. Brown, Sean M. Lynn-Jones, Steven E. Miller, eds., Debating the Democratic Peace (Cambridge: MIT Press, 1996).
3/24 Trade and Security
Richard Rosecrance, The Rise of the Trading State: Commerce and Conquest in the Modern World (New York: Basic Books, 1986), 22-43. (ER)
Dale Copeland, “Economic Interdependence and War: A Theory of Trade Expectations,” International Security 20, 4 (Spring 1996), 5-41.
Edward Mansfield and Brian Pollins, “The Study of Interdependence and Conflict,” Journal of Conflict Resolution 45, 6 (December 2001), 834-859.
Katherine Barbieri, “Economic Interdependence: A Path to Peace or a Source of Interstate Conflict?” Journal of Peace Research 33, 1 (1996), 29-49.
Skim
Stephen Brooks, “Reflections on Producing Security,” Security Studies 16, 4 (October 2007), 637-678.
Peter Liberman, "The Spoils of Conquest," International Security 18 (Fall 1993), pp. 125-153
3/31 Military Organizations,
Ideas, and Culture
Jack Snyder, The Ideology of the Offensive: Military Decision Making and the Disasters of 1914 (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1989). Chapter 1 (ER).
OR
Barry R. Posen, The Sources of Military Doctrine (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1984). Chapter 2 (ER).
Jack S. Levy, “Organization Routines and the Causes of War.” International Studies Quarterly 30 (June 1986), 192-222.
Jeffrey W. Legro, “Culture and Preferences in the International Cooperation Two-Step,” American Political Science Review 90, 1 (March 1996), 118-137.
Ronald L. Jepperson,
Alexander Wendt, and Peter Katzenstein, “Norms,
Identity and Culture in National Security,” in The Culture of National Security: Norms and Identity in World Politics
(New York: Columbia University Press, 1996), Chapter Two (ER)
Elizabeth Kier, “Culture and Military
Doctrine:
Stephen Peter Rosen, “Military Effectiveness:
Why Society Matters,” International
Security 19, 4 (Spring 1995), 5-31.
See
Michael Desch, “Assessing the Importance of Ideas in Security Studies,” International Security 23, 1 (Summer 1998), 141-170.
4/7 Inducements, Coercion, and Force
David Baldwin, “What is Economic Statecraft?” Economic Statecraft (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1985), 29-50. (ER)
David Baldwin, “The Sanctions Debate and the Logic of Choice,” International Security 24, 3 (Winter 1999-2000), 90-136.
Robert Pape, “Explaining Military Coercion,” Bombing to Win (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1996), 12-54. (ER)
Thomas C. Schelling, “The Diplomacy of Violence,” Arms and Influence (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1966), 1-34. (ER)
Daniel Byman and Matthew Waxman, The Dynamics of Coercion: American Foreign
Policy and the Limits of Military Might.
Steven E. Lobell, “Second Face of Security Strategies: Anglo-German and Anglo-Japanese Trade Concessions During the 1930s,” Security Studies (forthcoming). (ER)
Skim Briefly
Jonathan Kirshner, “The Microfoundations of Economic Sanctions,” Security Studies 6, 3 (Spring 1997), 32-64.
Daryl G. Press, “The Credibility of Power: Assessing Threats during the ‘Appeasement’ Crises of the 1930s,” International Security 29, 3 (Winter 2004/05), 136-169.
Robert A. Pape, “Why Economic Sanctions Still Do Not Work," International
Security 23.1 (Summer 1998), 66-77
4/14 Technology and War
Steven Van Evera, “Offense, Defense, and the Causes of War,” International Security 22, 4 (1998), 5-43.
Or
Stephen Van Evera, “The Cult of the Offensive and the Origins of the First World War,” International Security 9 (Summer 1984), pp. 58-107.
Charles L. Glaser and Chaim Kaufmann, “What is the Offense-Defense Balance and How to Measure It?” International Security (Spring 1998), 44-82.
Kenneth N. Waltz, "The Spread of Nuclear Weapons: More May be Better," Adelphi Paper 171 (London: International Institute for Strategic Studies, 1981). (R)
Keir A. Lieber, “The New History of World War I and What it Means for International Relations Theory,” International Security 32, 3 (Fall 2007),
Robert Jervis, “Cooperation under the Security Dilemma,” World Politics 30, 2 (January 1978), 167-214.
4/21 Human Security
Ann J. Tickner, “Feminist Responses to International Security Studies,” Peace Review 16, 1(March 2004), 43-48.
Roland Paris, “Human Security: Paradigm Shift or Hot Air,” International Security 26, 2 (Fall 2001), 87-102.
Homer Dixon, “On the Threshold: Environmental Changes as Causes of Acute Conflict,” International Security 16, 2 (fall 1991), 76-116.
P. W. Singer, “Corporate Warriors: The Rise of Privitized Military Industry and its Ramifications for International Security,” International Security 26, 3 (Winter 2001/2), 186-220.
Valerie M. Hudson “The Security Threat of
Asia's Sex Ratios,” The